Formal Analysis
of Ideological Components
# of Behavior

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A completely developed SYSTEM OF DISCOURSE — whether COGNITIVE or EVALUATIVE — seems to consist of at least: (1) three non-overlapping SUBSYSTEMS of discourse, each with its own *variables* and *relations*; (2) a system of *coordinative definitions* specifying mutual correspondence between elements of different subsystems; (3) a system of implication or *transfer procedures* that can generate elements in one subsystem, which correspond to those in another, by performing an operation on both the recipient and the donor subsystem; and (4) a system of *decision procedures* for the acceptance or rejection of donated elements.

The three subsystems of COGNITIVE discourse will be called (1) the *ACCOUNTING* discourse system, (2) the *CONCEPTUAL* discourse system, and (3) the *SYMBOLIC* discourse system. The three cognate subsystems of EVALUATIVE discourse will be called, (1) the *AESTHETIC* discourse system, (2) the *ETHICAL* discourse system, and (3) the *RELIGIOUS* discourse system.

Let us start with the COGNITIVE discourse and its *ACCOUNTING* discourse system. Its variables are objects which may assume different distinguishable states when exposed to the environment. These objects are called observers, and a record of their states is called events. The relations between different states of (the same or different) observers, *i.e.,* between events, are called patterns.

Similarly, the *AESTHETIC* discourse subsystem of the EVALUATIVE discourse has as its variables objects which can produce different states of the environment. These objects are called effectors. Operations of data production generate (codetermine) different patterns of states of perceptors; in the aesthetic system these patterns are constructed as moods or emotions. Through the aesthetic system the actor becomes engaged in the world and by it. This produces the phenomenological experience of existence ('ek-sistence') as a subject. The basic evaluative dimensions of action and transaction which emerge with the aesthetic system are: (1) with respect to effectors, mastery *vs.* impotence; (2) with respect to perceptors, various moods of well-being *vs.* misery.

The second subsystem of cognitive discourse is the *CONCEPTUAL* discourse system. Its variables are concepts of qualities (e.g., color). The variables of a conceptual system are defined syntactically by the logical class operations of identity, inclusion, and exclusion. Cognitive attributes regarded as identical are collapsed into the same general quality, class, or variable. Cognitive attributes that can be included as members of a class (as red into color), become element concepts, *i.e.,* intervals (value ranges) of a variable. Different values of the same variable may be ordered, again only by the operations of inclusion, identity, and exclusion. Attributes that cannot be included are retained as conceptually independent variables. The mutually exclusive qualities span a conceptual, attribute, or nominal space. All combinations of all the values of constituent variables are treated as conceptually possible and are coordinated so that they could at least be named — and talked or

thought about. <u>Propositions</u> assert which of the conceptually possible statements have cognitive validity. Variables connected by propositions constitute a conceptual subspace that is cognitively significant. By the removal of unconnected variables, the conceptual space (the knowable world) is reduced to one needed for a sensible cognitive discourse, *i.e.,* discourse about the known world. This method of reduction of the conceptual space uses as its sole criterion of reduction the degree of connectedness between variables. Barton and Lazarsfeld[2] call it the 'functional' method of conceptual space reduction.

The ETHICAL system of discourse has also qualities as its variables, with includable attributes as value intervals. The general ethical attribute space contains all the possible combinations of values, and general ethical propositions potentially connect many of its variables. However, before it can be determined which combinations make specific ethical sense, a special type of ethical space reduction must be performed, called by Barton and Lazarsfeld[3] the 'pragmatic' space reduction.

The first step consists of making a distinction between preferred or *essential variables* — and all the other variables. A subspace of the ethical attribute space is thus segregated as the essential space. Next, values of essential variables are ordered by preference into desirable, undesirable, and indifferent. The logical product of desirable value intervals defines the *desirability region* of the essential space.

The act of defining the essential space and the desirability region is called a <u>commitment</u>. Once a commitment is made, only those variables that are connected by propositions to essential variables (more precisely, to desirable and undesirable values of essential variables) have any specific ethical significance. The ethical space is reduced to these variables.

The structure of ethical space has at the same time been translated into a functional form. The values of the essential variables become products of a set of functions; the values of nonessential variables become the arguments of these functions. All the values of nonessential variables that map into the desirability region are instrumental or eufunctional; those that map into the undesirability region are dysfunctional; those that map into neither constitute an indifference domain. The preferred values of essential variables now become standards of value (or goals), and the instrumentally significant propositions, whether eu- or dysfunctional, become <u>rules of conduct</u> or <u>maxims</u>.

The act of commitment and the subsequent reduction and differentiation of the ethical space generate two dimensions of evaluation: (1) for action, its pragmatic significance *vs.* insignificance, and (2) for transaction, the resultant isolation *vs.* solidarity or antagonism of the actors.

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[2] BARTON & LAZARSFELD.

[3] *Ibid.*

Phenomenologically, a commitment is the prerequisite of the experience of <u>identity</u>.

In cognitive discourse, elements of the conceptual discourse system are coordinated to elements of the accounting discourse system by <u>*operational definitions*</u>. Thus, several specific observers may be defined as sensitive to a given quality; and specified particular states of such observers are said to reflect the actual existence of a value interval of the quality. Analogous to operational definitions are, in the evaluative discourse, the <u>cathexes</u>, which translate ethical into aesthetic discourse.

While in cognitive discourse states of the accounting system are made conceptually relevant by being interpreted as <u>indicators</u> of actuality of specific attributes and propositions, in evaluative discourse the conditions of the aesthetic system are made ethically relevant by being interpreted as specific <u>sanctions</u>.

The last subsystem of cognitive discourse, the *EXPLANATORY* system of discourse, has as its variables completely formal empty symbols, which are purely syntactically defined. As its relations, it has similarly formal and in fact empty ideas, such as mathematical functions or structures, and basic principles of various kinds of order or disorder.

The last subsystem of evaluative discourse is the *RELIGIOUS* system of discourse. Its variables are symbols, in a broad sense empty and formal. Its relations as well are in a broad sense empty ideas and principles of order and disorder. However, while the cognitive explanatory system is primarily analytic, and can be characterized by its structure (the values of all its relations), the religious system appears to be more synthetic, and is best characterized by its <u>conditions</u>, *i.e.,* the qualities and texture of its regions.[4]

This seeming amorphousness of even fully developed religious systems is replaced by definiteness of orientation, if the religious system is experienced from the perspective of any one of its regions. The boundary of a region may be then regarded as the <u>individuation</u> boundary, distinguishing the being or beings in this condition from others. Being individuated by a definite condition makes it possible to have the experience of <u>uniqueness</u>. The <u>essence</u> of a person's or a collectivity's uniqueness (individuality) lies in the defining attributes of his condition. For the individuated, the attributes of his religious condition are the only relevant sources of valuation (he is unique).

The religious condition attributes are also his virtues and vices. They define for the individuated a <u>salvation</u> and a <u>damnation region</u> in the religious space. The rest of the religious space is then evaluated from the perspective of individuated salvation / damnation, and the functionally significant subspace is defined as the actor's <u>religious</u>

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[4]   S. C. PEPPER. *World Hypotheses.* Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1942.
    Cf. "Contextualism," pp. 232-279.

<u>situation</u>. Like any other situation, the religious situation is defined by the demarcation of a *time - space - interest boundary*.

The drawing of an individuation boundary around one condition rather than another is the ultimate evaluative choice, since it determines the sources of the evaluation of standards, goals, qualities, and performances. The drawing of the time - space - interest boundary around a religious region is then the ultimate source of evaluation of rules of conduct and maxims, as well as moods. The redrawing of the t-s-i boundary becomes the ultimate recourse, when an evaluative transformation of pragmatic instrumentality structures is required.

The dimensions of evaluation that emerge on the religious level are: (1) for action, <u>normative control</u> (fixation) *vs.* <u>anomie</u>, and (2) for transaction, <u>meaning</u> *vs.* <u>absurdity</u>.

In COGNITIVE discourse, the conceptual and explanatory systems are coordinated by <u>lexical definitions</u> (of conceptual variables as variable symbols). Alternately, they are coordinated by the inverse process of <u>interpretation</u>.

In EVALUATIVE discourse, <u>identification</u> is the coordinative definition analogous to lexical definition in cognitive discourse. Identifications anchor categories of the ethical system to corresponding categories of the religious system. They translate the boundaries of essential space into the individuation boundaries, values of essential variables into condition attributes, standards into virtues and vices, the ethical desirability region into the salvation region, etc. From the psychological and/or sociological points of view, the identification of ethical commitment with a *regula* (akin to a Durkheimian non-contractual element of contract) seems to be a prerequisite for the internalization of individual <u>commitments</u> and <u>loyalties</u>, and the institutionalization of collective ones. (This process is aided by the religious "sanctions" of legitimating and condemning, to be discussed later.)

The moral interpretation, coordinating the ethical to the religious, is the <u>sense of duty</u>, which together with the <u>sense of responsibility</u> infuses ethical standards with the religious significance of virtues and vices, and pragmatic maxims (rules of conduct) with concern about religious rules of relevance. This linkage upgrades ethical and pragmatic discourse into MORAL discourse. In cognitive discourse, a truly theoretical discourse emerges only when there is an adequate coordination of conceptual and explanatory discourse. Similarly, it is the prerequisite of moral discourse, that there be an adequate coordination of ethical and religious discourse by identifications and loyalties, or by a sense of duties and responsibilities.

When they are sufficiently developed, the theoretical and the moral discourse each can generate new categories and relations by the following *implication procedures*:

In COGNITIVE discourse, once a conceptual system is adequately <u>formalized</u> (*i.e.,* lexically tied to a formal explanatory structure), two basic theoretical implication procedures become possible: (1) <u>explanation</u> and (2) <u>deductive inference</u>.

In principle, explanation is simple. Having previously defined lexically some concepts (formalized some propositions) of a conceptual system C in terms of specific symbols (and functions) of an explanatory system E, we ask: Does a proposition newly included in C have a corresponding function in the relevant[5] substructure of E? If such a function exists in E, the new proposition in C is said to have been explained, since it could have been deductively inferred from the other propositions in C already formalized in E. If not, either confidence in the theory (the coordination of C and E) is decreased, or the proposition is judged invalid.

Deductive inference produces propositions in a conceptual space by mapping the structure of the explanatory on the conceptual space, and by specifying that those and only those conceptually possible propositions, that correspond to the imposed functions, are theoretically permissible. By their mapping on the conceptual space, the explanatory relations (functions) are already interpreted as conceptual relations (propositions). The propositions not previously present in the conceptual space are said to have been deduced. Had they already been present in the conceptual space, they would have been said to have been explained by exactly the same procedure.

For deductive inference, the conditions of previous coordination, relevance, and compatibility (non-contradiction) with previously explained propositions must be satisfied, as was the case with explanation. In spite of (or because of?) these and additional requirements for acceptance of deduced propositions, an identical advanced explanatory system can occasionally, by an appropriate nonessential transformation of its structure, imply covariant propositions valid in very different conceptual system and true in equally different accounting systems. In such a case, the same explanatory structure not only infuses objective knowledge into otherwise different cognitive discourses, but it also can measure, explain, and predict the domain of the knowable and the perceivable within a conceptual and an accounting discourse biased by a particular perspective and selection of variables.

Moral implication procedures are possible only when there emerges a rather full moral discourse. As in the case of the theoretical discourse, moral discourse consists of the interaction of three systems, *i.e.,* the ethical, the religious, and the coordinative system. While ethical discourse is contingent but pragmatically relevant, religious discourse is

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[5]   Criteria of relevance vary, but one could be that the function is between symbols previously used to define lexically the concepts connected by the new proposition, and that the same symbols already participate in the successful explanation of other propositions in **C**.

ideal but pragmatically irrelevant. The coordinative system of identifications with, and loyalties to, the ideal, and the corresponding sense of duty and responsibility, combine in the evaluative discourse what is categorical with what is pragmatically relevant. The two moral implication procedures are (1) <u>categorical judgment</u>, and (2) <u>categorical command</u>.

<u>Categorical judgment</u> is the evaluative analog of explanation. Given an ethical system previously coordinated to a religious system, an ethical standard or a maxim will be justified as <u>legitimate</u>, if it is compatible with the relevant subsystem of ideals. It will be <u>condemned</u> (judged guilty, unjust, or unconstitutional), if it is incompatible. As in the case of non-explanation of a proposition, which gives rise to a crisis in cognitive confidence, a crisis in evaluative confidence arises when the verdict is condemnation. The crisis can be resolved by either rejecting the particular ethical posture, or by rejecting the moral system.

<u>Categorical command</u> is the evaluative analog of deductive inference. It requires similar conditions of coordination of the religious with the ethical as categorical judgment. A categorical command specifies that only those possible relations in ethical space that conform to it are morally valid. A categorical command thus operates on the general ethical space, not only on pragmatically reduced space. It may simply restrict the range of morally valid commitments, standards, or rules of conduct. Where it commands what already obtains, it gives it an administrative, rather than a judicial legitimating. However, such an event contributes, from a psychological or a sociological point of view, to the internalization or institutionalization of prevailing ethical relations.

Since compliance with categorical commands is not contingent on pragmatic judgment or on aesthetic sanctions, a command can specify categorically the moral desirability of a state or a relation that is ethically undesirable. In this case the command can be rejected (1) on the grounds of its incompatibility with other categorical commands or judgments, or (2) on the grounds of irrelevance, insubordination or illegitimate authority. In the second case the grounds are that the command maps into an ethical domain that has not been previously coordinated (subordinated) to the issuing religious system. This situation is again analogous to that of deductive inference, in the latter case of *ad hoc* inference.

By the same token it seems that a religious system could be sufficiently advanced to be capable of issuing to different ethical systems co-variant categorical commands, that would be (1) ethically valid, (2) acceptable to the recipient systems, and yet (3) invariant with respect to the ideal from which they issued (e.g., Kingdom of Ends, *sacro egoismo),* as well as (4) relevant to a universal ideal condition (e.g., the rational, the sinful, the mortal, or the selfish man).